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The Impact of Telecommunications 
Privatization in Peru on the 
Welfare of Urban Consumers 
spihe Peruvian government privatized Compa??a Peruana de Tel?fonos 
1 (CPT) and Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) 
in 
1 1994. Both enterprises were purchased by Telef?nica de Espa?a. The 
record of the telecommunications sector under state management was very 
poor. By 1993 Peru had strikingly low telephone coverage, with lines 
concentrated in the capital of Lima and in wealthy households. In com 
parison with international coverage and based on its level of per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP), Peru should have had eleven lines for every 
100 inhabitants. However, Peru's telephone density was a mere 2.6 lines 
in 1992, one of the lowest of the region. The waiting time for a new line 
in 1993 was 118 months, whereas customers in Colombia were waiting 
seventeen months and those in Mexico, eleven months. 
Service quality was below international standards. In 1992, only 40 per 
cent of all phone calls were actually completed, partly as a result of the 
small size and obsolete technology of the network, which easily became 
congested. Inadequate maintenance also affected communications quality. 
Telephone cables have a useful life of fifteen years, but in 1993 some of 
the cables in use were over sixty years old. Only 33 percent of the network 
was digital. 
CPT and ENTEL both had an excessive number of employees, which 
resulted in low productivity and a distorted structure of operating costs. 
Torero and Pasco-Font are with the Group of Analysis for Development (GRADE). 
Schroth is with Ecole des HEC, Universit? de Lausanne. 
This research was supported by the Tinker Foundation. We are indebted to a remarkably 
talented team of research assistants that includes Virgilio Galdo, Eduardo Maruyama, and 
Gissele Gajate. 
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Another distinctive feature of the Peruvian telecommunications sector 
during this time was a skewed tariff structure. Installation charges were 
quite high by international standards (close to U.S.$1,000 per residential 
telephone line in 1993), while the flat monthly charge was relatively low. 
In contrast, tariffs for long-distance and local calls were quite high. This 
tariff structure was based on the idea that only rich consumers with inelas 
tic demand used the international long-distance service, which led to a 
cross subsidy between that service and local telephone calls. Because this 
distorted tariff structure failed to finance universal service, only rich 
households enjoyed telephone service in Peru in the early 1990s. 
Privatization was designed to increase coverage, boost efficiency, and 
encourage a competitive market in the medium term. The privatization 
contract set specific investment goals to relax the existing supply con 
straint. To foster competition, the contract also established a five-year 
"rebalancing" period, so that tariffs would reflect their long-term marginal 
costs. Adjusting tariffs immediately was considered too harsh for con 
sumer welfare. 
The resulting improvements in telecommunications were impressive. 
Between 1993 and 1998, the number of lines installed increased by 
167 percent. Thus, Telef?nica amply met the concession contract's cover 
age goals. By 1998, the entire market for basic telephone service was cov 
ered and the waiting list was eliminated. Service quality also improved 
substantially. Fully 90 percent of the network was digital, and 99 percent 
of local and international long-distance calls were completed. Tariff bal 
ance was achieved and the sector was open to free competition several 
months ahead of schedule. 
Table 1 presents two tests comparing pre- and postprivatization firm 
performance indicators. The first test is a first-difference analysis using 
firm and year fixed effects to analyze the difference between the pre- and 
postprivatization information. The second is a difference-in-differences 
test. The difference-in-differences statistic not only tests for a change in 
the firm's performance relative to the preprivatization period, but it also 
takes into account performance relative to a control group that didn't go 
through the privatization process. The control group used is the main Peru 
vian water and sanitation firm (SEDAPAL), which was not privatized but 
which went through a reform process similar to that of the telecommuni 
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cations firm in the preprivatization period. The specific sectoral per capita 
gross national product (GNP) is also included to control for the size of the 
two different sectors. 
As shown in the table, all the performance indicators with the excep 
tion of leverage improved significantly. This holds when a control group 
is included and the second difference is calculated. The profitability 
ratios moved from being negative, on average, to positive in magnitudes 
from 17 percent to 40 percent. Accordingly, net profits over earnings 
jumped from 5 percent in 1993 to almost 25 percent in 1997. While total 
profits amounted to U.S.$35.5 million in 1993, in 1997 they were 
U.S.$400 million. 
Sales efficiency saw a fourfold increase after privatization, and net 
income efficiency rose by more than ten times. Employee productivity, as 
measured by lines in service per employee, increased from eighty-seven 
in 1994 to 275 in 1998. The waiting period for a new line fell from 
118 months in 1993 to 1.5 months in 1998. One major explanation for such 
a remarkable increase in operating efficiency is that employment was 
reduced by more than half after the privatization process, which clearly 
affected labor productivity. The significant improvement of all the other 
performance indicators shows that total factor productivity also increased 
after the privatization process. 
Despite these results, public opinion regarding the privatization process, 
of which the telecommunications sector was the flagship, became increas 
ingly negative over time, as shown in figure 1. In 1992 almost 60 percent 
of the population was in favor of privatization, but this percentage dropped 
to just over 20 percent by December 1999. Consumer satisfaction was 
sharply divided along socioeconomic lines: more than three-quarters of 
those from the highest socioeconomic group supported privatization, com 
pared with only 21 percent approval from the lowest socioeconomic group. 
Interestingly, of all the public services, telecommunications was seen as the 
one that least satisfied the needs of its consumers (see figure 2). 
Specifically, this paper analyzes how, in addition to the improvement in 
the performance of the firm and the quality of service, the privatization of 
the telecommunications industry in Peru led to price changes that had an 
impact on consumer welfare and that may be correlated with the negative 
public opinion of the privatization process. 
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FIGURE 1. Approval Rate of the Privatization Process 
Percent 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Source: Commission for the Promotion of Private Investment (C0PRI). 
1997 1998 1999 
Measuring Consumer Welfare 
It is not our intention to obtain an indicator of aggregate welfare by adding 
up the welfare of each group affected by privatization. Although we 
follow many ideas suggested by Galal and others and by Martin and 
Parker, we use a different model to value consumer welfare.1 Basically, 
our purpose is more specific and aims at measuring the net effects on con 
sumers before and after privatization. We first model the market for each 
product in the pre- and postprivatization scenarios, then identify changes 
in access to and use of each service, and finally measure consumer surplus 
changes in both stages. 
Households' preferences are represented by a utility function, 
(d U 
? 
UyXLocal, XNLD, X?LD, Z), 
in which x is consumption of each service available to a residential cus 
tomer (namely, local calls, national long-distance calls, and international 
long-distance calls) and z is a consumption index of other goods. Solving 
1. Galal and others (1994) and Martin and Parker (1997). 
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FIGURE 2. Approval Rate of Privatization by Socioeconomic Group, May 1999 
Percent 
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the optimization problem, we derive the indirect utility function, V(p, y), 
in which y is the income of each household and p is a vector with prices of 
the three basic services and a general price index for the remaining goods. 
To access a service, a household compares the value of using the ser 
vice, V(p, y), with the cost of access. Having a phone line allows cus 
tomers to make three types of calls (that is, local, national long-distance, 
and international long-distance). On the panel, among the households for 
which we were able to obtain a telephone bill, some households make only 
local calls while others make local and long-distance calls. We can thus 
order households according to their consumption decisions. 
Econometrically, we model the demand for a specific telecommunica 
tions service as a two-stage decision rule. First, we model the decision to 
access the network using a probit model. From this equation, we obtain the 
inverse Mills ratio to correct for the access problem. This ratio is included 
in demand estimations to obtain price elasticities and consumer surpluses 
for the three services under study, correcting for the bias for lack of access. 
Because we use a household panel that evidences variations in prices, 
income, and demographic characteristics, we can directly calibrate the 
position of each curve at different points of time without additional 
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assumptions in unobserved variables. Furthermore, it is not necessary to 
assume linearity for the demand curves, and we chose the functional form 
of the demand curves to obtain the best fit rather than for algebraic sim 
plicity.2 Because of data restrictions, however, our demand estimations do 
not capture changes in quality of the different telephone services. 
The functional form that yields the best fit is 
(2) qi 
= 
exp^?* 
+ p/Van + zu ). 
The superscript indicates the socioeconomic level; i identifies the house 
hold; and t represents time. The relevant prices are p/Y, so the elasticities 
are recovered from the parameter, a, for each socioeconomic level. Lastly, 
qit is the measured traffic for each of the three services considered in this 
study. 
After calibrating the demand functions, we measure consumer welfare 
five years before and five years after privatization. The combined effect of 
increasing the number of telephone line installations and reducing access 
charges boosted consumer welfare from its preprivatization levels. 
Our welfare measure is the difference between the consumer surplus of 
making a certain number of calls and the fixed amount paid for accessing 
the line (the value of the flat installation charge converted to an annuity). 
For a given socioeconomic level, j, we define 
(3) S'(Pl,,.) 
= 
rJql(p,.)dp9 
V/ e {Local, NLD, ILD} 
as the consumer surplus for using the line for any of the three services, rit 
as the annual installment made on the flat installation charge, and Pmax as 
the maximum price the consumers will observe for each of the services, 
which is instrumentalized by the maximum price over the period under 
analysis. Thus the equation, 
(4) Si(pu,rlt) 
= 
^Sl(pt)-rlt, 
j 
measures the total net surplus of all services. Replacing the functional 
form given in equation 2 and solving the equation, we obtain the surplus 
as 
S?(Vu,r?) =-exp(xit?'' 
+ p?<x> + eitf^ 
- 
rit and, therefore, 
2. See Pasco-Font, Gallardo, and Fry (1999). 
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(5) S?(pit,rit) =-rexp^?'+p'cc'+e,)-/-*, aJ 
in which a7 is the elasticity of the price itself for the socioeconomic level j. 
Empirical Estimations 
We use data from a 1997 household panel specially surveyed for this study 
regarding access and monthly consumption of telecommunications ser 
vices over the previous year. We applied the survey to households in Met 
ropolitan Lima, categorized into the high, middle, low, and very low 
socioeconomic levels. We also included households from the high, mid 
dle, low, and very low socioeconomic levels of four other major cities in 
Peru: Cusco, Arequipa, Chiclayo, and Trujillo. We chose these cities 
based on the criteria of population and demand for telephone services. The 
survey sample is representative of approximately 7.6 million inhabitants, 
which account for 50 percent of Peru's urban population; the degree of 
representativity is actually greater owing to the similarity of the cities sur 
veyed and the larger cities of the Peruvian coast and the Andes. 
The survey questionnaire (applied directly to the most informed person 
in the household) consists of five sections: the present use and quality of 
the telecommunications services, the household's potential use of ser 
vices, characteristics of the household members, characteristics of the 
household, and a module for transcribing information from the home's 
telephone bill. The survey encompassed 1,707 urban households, which 
were selected in the 1996-97 period to represent the residential demand 
for telephone services in Metropolitan Lima and in Peru's principal 
provincial cities.3 
This section reports demand estimates for basic telephone services and 
computes household welfare changes for socioeconomic levels A through 
D, where level D is the poorest. We also use previous results for house 
holds belonging to socioeconomic levels A and B for provinces outside of 
Lima.4 The demand estimation corrects for the selection bias resulting 
3. For more details on the survey, see Pasco-Font, Gallardo, and Fry (1999); OSIPTEL 
(1995); and Torero and Pasco-Font (2000). 
4. Torero and Pasco-Font (2000). 
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from whether consumers have a telephone, as well as for the selection bias 
caused by households for which telephone bill information could not be 
obtained. 
The prices used are implicit prices, given that we do not have enough 
information to distinguish between calls made during peak hours (that is, 
the peak price) and those made during off-peak hours (that is, the off-peak 
price). The implicit price reproduces the true price for telecommunications 
services faced by urban households. Because the variable is generated 
using as inputs the quantity consumed and the total expenses in each ser 
vice, the implicit price should only reflect a lineal combination of both 
peak and off-peak prices. We thus do not generate a spurious price, as 
could be erroneously assumed. The following equation illustrates this 
idea: 
k EXPENDITURE, qf* peak qf'** 
(6) pu=-=^? pr*+?? p? 
** 
qk qk qk 
= 
[pT^a 
+ 
pf-^?] for k 
= Local, NLD, ILD, 
where a 4- ? 
= 1. 
Figure 3 also provides evidence that the effective price faced by the 
households is a lineal combination of both peak and off-peak prices. For 
instance, the figure shows that any deviation from the intersection point 
between the implicit price and the effective peak price reflects, precisely, 
the idea of a lineal combination of prices. 
We also included a dummy variable identifying whether the house 
holds possess cellular phones. Access to cellular phones is a crucial fac 
tor, especially since 1997 when the intensity of cellular phones increased 
substantially. Cellular phone density jumped from 0.2 in 1993 to 3 in 
1998. Cellular phones are a complement of fixed phones, however, not a 
substitute. 
The econometric estimations exhibit the expected signs and coefficients 
(see the appendix for details on the regressions). Furthermore, the price of 
international long-distance service is significant (and has a positive sign) 
in explaining the use of local and national long-distance services, indicat 
ing some degree of substitution between the two products. Household edu 
cation and income are also significant and have the expected signs. The 
fixed district effects that we included were significant as a whole accord 
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FIGURE 3. Lineal Combination: Implicit Price and Peak Price9 
Implicit price 
.213986 
.074444 
.183 .214 
Effective peak price 
a. The effective peak prices during the period of study were 0.183,0.187,0.188,0.189,0.193,0.209,0.210,0.214, and 0.213, while 
the off-peak prices were 0.091,0.093,0.093,0.094,0.096,0.103,0.105,0.053, and 0.106. We take 0.193 as our analysis point. 
ing to the F statistical test.5 Given the functional form of our directly esti 
mated demand functions, when the percentage of change in the tariffs is 
the same, the percentage of change in household welfare is also the same. 
In other words, household welfare does not depend on total consumption, 
but rather on the parameters of the demand function. However, the mea 
sure of the change in the consumer surplus varies from home to home 
because the flat monthly service charge represents a different proportion 
of each home's spending on telephone service. This variance is naturally 
less within each socioeconomic level given that each level comprises 
households with similar spending patterns on basic telephone services. 
Demand for use of local and national long-distance services is inelastic 
in all cases. The price elasticities were -0.49, -0.478, and -1.095 for local 
5. See Torero and Pasco-Font (2000) for details on other controls and econometric esti 
mations used. 
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TABLE 2. Total Consumer Surplus 
Millions of U.S. dollars 
Type of service 1993 1994 1995 1996 71998 
Local 5.8 8.7 11.1 14.1 17.5 17.9 
National long-distance 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.2 3
International long-distance 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.4 82 2
Total 5.3 10.5 13.5 17.4 21.5 23.2 
Total-fixed rent 6.2 7.7 9.7 11.2 12.9 12.7 
Growth rate (percent) 
? 
24 26 1515 -  
calls, national long-distance calls, and international long-distance calls, 
respectively.6 This result is consistent with many other studies.7 Moreover, 
Torero and Pasco-Font calculate these elasticities for all urban Peru using 
the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys 
for 1994 and 1997; they find that the size of the elasticity remains the same 
over time, which validates our use of a single elasticity to calculate the 
consumer surplus for the period under study.8 
Using the demand elasticities thus obtained, we measure the welfare 
effects of tariff readjustments for all three services and for increases in the 
flat monthly charge (see equations 3 through 5). The welfare gains of 
households that obtained a connection to the fixed network after privatiza 
tion are also incorporated to capture the total change in consumer surplus. 
To do this, we used census information on total penetration ratios and the 
total number of households to quantify the number of new households that 
obtained a telephone line in the following period (t + 1). We assumed that 
households that had just obtained a line would not place as much value on 
the service as households that had spent a long time on the waiting list, so 
we assigned them the minimum welfare for the households in their socio 
economic level and pertinent year. We performed a number of simulations 
assigning different surplus values to these households that had recently 
acquired telephone lines, but the results were not substantially affected. 
Tables 2 and 3 and figures 4 and 5 summarize our main results. Since 
privatization in 1994, there has been an absolute gain in total consumer 
6. The price elasticities for provinces outside of Lima were -0.69, -0.55, and -1.59 for 
local, national long-distance, and international long-distance calls, respectively. 
7. For example, Pasco-Font, Gallardo, and Fry (1999); Doherty ( 1984); Zona and Jacob 
(1990); Gatto, Kelejian, and Stephan (1988); Gatto and others (1988); Duncan and Perry 
(1994); and Levy (1996). 
8. Torero and Pasco-Font (2000). 
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TABLE 3. Per Household Consumer Surplus by Socioeconomic Level 
Socioeconomic level 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
High (level A) 
Medium (level B) 
Low (level C) 
Very low (level D) 
44.5 
18.6 
7.6 
6.0 
54.7 
19.8 
6.8 
4.5 
58.5 
23.8 
6.6 
0.5 
63.4 
23.5 
9.0 
1.3 
67.4 
26.6 
8.2 
0.9 
62.7 
23.8 
8.2 
1.3 
surplus by service and by socioeconomic level, with only a small reduction 
in the growth rate of consumer surplus after 1997. The story is not uniform 
across different socioeconomic levels, however, when we analyze the per 
household consumer surplus. As shown in table 3, the high and medium 
socioeconomic levels (A and B) experienced a clear gain in welfare, but 
the welfare gains decreased after 1996 for the low and very low socioeco 
nomic consumer levels (C and D). Welfare levels are lower than prepriva 
tization levels for very low income consumers (socioeconomic level D), 
and the low socioeconomic level (socioeconomic level C) per household 
received increasing gains only after 1996. Even more, relatively the per 
household consumer surplus has a regressive distribution. Given that the 
FIGURE 4. Change in Consumer Surplus by Socioeconomic Level 
Percent 
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 
I High m Medium BLow D Very low 
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FIGURE 5. Change in per Capita Consumer Surplus by Socioeconomic Level 
Percent 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
?High El Medium Blow D Very low 
majority of the people surveyed in public opinion polls are from the low 
socioeconomic level, it is understandable that public opinion regarding pri 
vatization and, specifically, telecommunications privatization has wors 
ened over time. 
The main explanation for the fall in consumer surplus is fundamentally 
the permanent increase in the fixed monthly payment, as shown in figure 6. 
This given percentage price increase had a greater impact on lower socio 
economic levels, because these households use the service less (that is, 
they make fewer calls). As a result, a greater proportion of their spending 
goes to pay the flat monthly charge. There is also a cross-price impact with 
local calls, since the proportionately larger reduction of long-distance tar 
iffs led to a substitution of local calls for long-distance calls. 
Figure 7 compares how much a consumer spends in each service for a 
given amount of minutes using prices before and after privatization. As can 
be seen for local calls, a consumer would only experience a benefit with 
respect to the preprivatization prices if she consumes around 700 pulses 
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FIGURE 6. Evolution of Telecommunications Tariffs 
Fixed charge Local rate 
91/6 92/1 92/6 93/1 93/6 94/1 94/6 95/1 95/6 96/1 96/6 97/1 97/6 
Year/month 
(2,100 minutes) a month, something that only happens in the high socio 
economic levels. The benefits of privatization are substantial in long 
distance services, especially in international long-distance, which again is 
mainly used by high socioeconomic sectors. 
To make things worse, in 1997 the agency that regulates telecommuni 
cations changed the unit of measure of local calls from three-minute 
blocks to one-minute units and also expanded the definition of the geo 
graphic area. These measures translated into an increase in the price of a 
local call. This explains the reduction of growth in the total consumer sur 
plus since 1997. When we compare the price of local calls and fixed 
monthly fees in Peru with prices in Argentina and Chile?two countries 
that have also been through a privatization process?it is clear that there 
is still room for tariff reduction in Peru. 
Conclusions and Final Comments 
As a result of poor state management, the Peruvian telecommunications 
sector was characterized in the early 1990s by low coverage, a long wait 
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FIGURE 7. Evaluation of the Impact of Changes in Tariffs 
Total expenditure (in 1994 soles) 
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for phone installation, outdated technology, poor service, and distorted 
prices. Privatization reversed the situation, bringing dramatic improve 
ments in coverage, quality, and technology. By 1998 Telef?nica del Peru 
had amply met the goals set in the concession contract and covered prac 
tically the entire market for basic telephony. In addition, the telecommu 
nications sector posted greater improvement than any other utilities sector 
after its privatization. Despite these results, however, the population is 
quite unhappy with the privatization process and specifically with the 
telecommunications privatization. 
This paper explored one of the possible elements that could explain this 
paradox by analyzing the welfare implications'of telecommunications pri 
vatization through the estimation of consumer surplus for different socio 
economic levels. The main conclusion of the paper is that on aggregate, 
privatization improved total consumer welfare, mainly by increasing con 
sumer access to the service. However, the tariff adjustment required to 
reflect long-term marginal costs had a relatively negative impact on some 
consumers. In particular, increases in the fixed monthly payment and the 
price of local calls negatively affected low and, especially, very low 
income households, as shown by a detailed per household analysis of con 
sumer 
surplus. 
The growth of total consumer surplus began falling in 1996, after three 
periods of constant growth. Moreover, our analysis of per household con 
sumer surplus indicates that clients with low usage that had a phone before 
privatization experienced welfare reductions. Regulatory changes exacer 
bated this welfare reduction: the reduction in the unit of measure for local 
calls from three minutes to one minute and the expansion in the geo 
graphic definition of local area further increased local tariffs. 
This problem could have been avoided if consumer plans had been 
introduced that took into account the differences among consumer groups. 
Households from the lowest socioeconomic level mostly use their phone 
for receiving calls; their major cost is thus the fixed monthly rent. A call 
ing plan featuring a low monthly fixed tariff and higher charges for local 
calls would improve the welfare of low-income households. The opposite 
is true in the case of rich households, whose major gain in welfare is 
through the intensive use of the phone. The welfare of these households 
would increase if local and long-distance tariffs were reduced while the 
fixed monthly tariff was increased. In either case, the central objective of 
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not breaking the equilibrium in the tariffs must be maintained to avoid the 
entrance of inefficient competitors. 
Finally, there is not enough competition in the sector. The price of long 
distance calls in Peru was still higher than in other South American coun 
tries for the period under analysis. Our decomposition of the consumer 
surplus also showed this result. Consumer gain from the use of national 
and international long-distance calls has not increased substantially, as 
was expected to happen. The situation is worse in the market for local 
calls. Lack of adequate interconnection fees prevented other companies 
from using the incumbent infrastructure to compete in the local market. 
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Appendix: Demand Estimations for Use of Telephones 
TABLE AI. Estimate of Local Use Demand in Lima3 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) 
Local rate 
International long-distance rate 
Domestic long-distance rate 
Income 
Income2 
Rate of penetration in Lima (network externality) 
Percentage of young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Percentage of female young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Number of persons in the household 
Educational level of household head: 
elementary school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: 
high school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: technical (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: university (dummy) 
Inverse Mills ratio (reported bill) 
Inverse Mills ratio (has telephone) 
Household with cellular phone 
Constant 
Summary statistic 
No. observations 
F 
Prob > f 
R2 
-2.50104** 
(1.0798) 
0.4666 r** 
(0.1454) 
-0.03021 
(0.0258) 
0.00020*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000** 
(0.0000) 
1.54653*** 
(0.4810) 
0.41540*** 
(0.1718) 
-0.19354 
(0.2733) 
0.05551*** 
(0.0116) 
0.67744*** 
(0.1646) 
0.00890 
(0.1048) 
0.00665 
(0.0622) 
0.26024*** 
(0.0977) 
-0.35224*** 
(0.0748) 
4.33102*** 
(0.3783) 
2,021 
39.18 
0.0000 
0.4472 
-2.43711** 
(1.0654) 
0.47299*** 
(0.1450) 
-0.03204 
(0.0258) 
0.00027*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000** 
(0.0000) 
1.50362** 
(0.4788) 
0.40969*** 
(0.1721) 
-0.20360 
(0.2736) 
0.04490*** 
(0.0118) 
0.75280*** 
(0.1711) 
0.05570 
(0.1056) 
0.03089 
(0.0626) 
0.27576*** 
(0.0980) 
-0.47613*** 
(0.1017) 
4.26831* 
(0.3703) 
2,021 
39.27 
0.0000 
0.4471 
-2.69987** 
(1.1453) 
0.56981** 
(0.2289) 
-0.06991 
(0.0688) 
0.00021*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000** 
(0.0000) 
1.68295*** 
(0.4783) 
0.42657*** 
(0.1716) 
-0.17186 
(0.2735) 
0.05667*** 
(0.0115) 
0.72627*** 
(0.1641) 
0.03071 
(0.1053) 
0.02754 
(0.0628) 
0.25576*** 
(0.0978) 
-0.36442*** 
(0.0747) , 
0.24504* 
(0.1301) 
4.40877*** 
(0.4474) 
2,021 
37.71 
0.0000 
0.4489 
^Statistically significant at 90 percent. 
^Statistically significant at 95 percent. 
***Statistically significant at 99 percent. 
a. The dependent variable is local traffic. The regressions include distria fixed effects. The ftest was significant with p < 0.001. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE A2. Estimate of Usage Demand for Domestic Long-Distance in Lima3 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) 
Domestic long-distance rate 
Local rate 
International long-distance rate 
Income 
Income2 
Percentage of young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Number of persons in the household 
Educational level of household head: 
elementary school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: 
high school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: technical (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: university (dummy) 
Relatives in provinces 
Inverse Mills ratio (reported bill) 
Inverse Mills ratio (has telephone) 
Household with cellular phone 
Constant 
Summary statistic 
No. observations 
F 
Prob > F 
R2 
-0.76450** 
(0.37495) 
-3.61770 
(2.38827) 
0.22918** 
(0.10061) 
0.00006 
(0.00011) 
-0.00000 
(0.00000) 
-0.90831*** 
(0.20355) 
0.06221*** 
(0.02063) 
0.03781 
(0.29940) 
-0.28387 
(0.18275) 
-0.14979 
(0.12789) 
-0.05385 
(0.18898) 
0.80352*** 
(0.10054) 
-0.16488 
(0.11459) 
0.32907 
(0.72941) 
1,993 
14.94 
0.000 
0.1802 
-0.77115** 
(0.37482) 
-3.45071 
(2.36629) 
0.22044** 
(0.09992) 
0.00008 
(0.00010) 
-0.00000 
(0.00000) 
-0.91983*** 
(0.20355) 
0.05668*** 
(0.02029) 
0.10872 
(0.30238) 
-0.22875 
(0.18482) 
-0.12488 
(0.12702) 
-0.04131 
(0.18872) 
0.80008*** 
(0.10075) 
-0.34240** 
(0.15569) 
0.46022 
(0.71547) 
1,993 
14.89 
0.000 
0.1813 
-0.76220** 
(0.3748) 
-3.61495 
(2.3863) 
0.22976** 
(0.1007) 
0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.91022*** 
(0.2036) 
0.06217*** 
(0.0206) 
0.03351 
(0.2997) 
-0.28673 
(0.1832) 
-0.15302 
(0.1284) 
-0.05584 
(0.1889) 
0.80190*** 
(0.1006) 
-0.16455 
(0.1147) 
-0.06049 
(0.2034) 
0.32950 
(0.7296) 
1,993 
14.47 
0.000 
0.1802 
"Statistically significant at 90 percent. 
""Statistically significant at 95 percent. 
"""Statistically significant at 99 percent. 
a. The dependent variable is domestic long-distance traffic. The regressions include distria fixed effeas. The F test was significant 
with p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE A3. Est?mate of Usage Demand for International Long-Distance in Lima3 
Explanatory variable (V (2) (3) 
International long-distance rate 
Local rate 
Domestic long-distance rate 
Income 
Income2 
Percentage of young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Number of persons in the household 
Educational level of household head: 
elementary school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: 
high school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: technical (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: university (dummy) 
Relatives abroad 
Inverse Mills ratio (reported bill) 
Inverse Mills ratio (has telephone) 
Household with cellular phone 
Constant 
Summary statistic 
No. observations 
F 
Prob > f 
R2 
-0.30032** 
(0.1327) 
3.27635 
(2.0692) 
0.47247** 
(0.2575) 
0.00032*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.24619 
(0.16210) 
-0.03342** 
(0.0164) 
0.03605 
(0.3390) 
0.24340* 
(0.1268) 
-0.07673 
(0.0748) 
-0.07979 
(0.1414) 
0.42043*** 
(0.0797) 
0.15635* 
(0.0915) 
-0.30561 
(0.6971) 
1,940 
8.63 
0.000 
0.107 
-0.29966** 
(0.1329) 
3.27247 
(2.0667) 
0.46549** 
(0.2579) 
0.00028*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.24692 
(0.16227) 
-0.02933* 
(0.0165) 
0.01072 
(0.3401) 
0.23572* 
(0.1301) 
-0.08159 
(0.0754) 
-0.08575 
(0.1413) 
0.41573*** 
(0.0795) 
0.15790 
(0.1263) 
-0.21470 
(0.6908) 
1,940 
8.61 
0.000 
0.106 
-0.30291** 
(0.1288) 
3.63210* 
(2.0169) 
0.16928 
(0.3120) 
0.00029*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.29232 
(0.1629) 
-0.02871* 
(0.0166) 
0.07742 
(0.3485) 
0.28810** 
(0.1272) 
-0.01962 
(0.0745) 
-0.05451 
(0.1481) 
0.43631*** 
(0.0796) 
0.15052* 
(0.0912) 
0.81969*** 
(0.2122) 
-0.2472 
(0.6871) 
1,940 
8.72 
0.000 
0.129 
"Statistically significant at 90 percent. 
""Statistically significant at 95 percent. 
"""Statistically significant at 99 percent. 
a. The dependent variable is international long-distance traffic. The regressions include district fixed effects. The ftest was signifi 
cant with p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE A4. Estimate of Local Use Demand in Rest of Peru8 
* &mtfr'?&!m^&is&&,<s* 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) 
Local rate 
International long-distance rate 
Domestic long-distance rate 
Income 
Income2 
Percentage of young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Percentage of female young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Number of persons in the household 
Educational level of household head: 
elementary school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: 
high school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: technical (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: university (dummy) 
Household in Trujillo (dummy) 
Household in Chiclayo (dummy) 
Household in Arequipa (dummy) 
Inverse Mills ratio (reported bill) 
Inverse Mills ratio (has telephone) 
Household with cellular phone 
Constant 
Summary statistic 
No. observations 
F 
Prob>f 
R2 
-2.51770** 
(1.0901) 
0.13041 
(0.1742) 
-0.16723** 
(0.0846) 
0.00026*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.10324 
(0.1607) 
0.05591 
(0.2101) 
0.02486 
(0.0159) 
0.02254 
(0.1537) 
0.34207* 
(0.1871) 
0.30234 
(0.2380) 
0.30172 
(0.2490) 
0.07068 
(0.1270) 
0.40604*** 
(0.1201) 
0.65684*** 
(0.0808) 
-0.21955* 
(0.1256) 
5.03441*** 
(0.6049) 
1,367 
18.84 
0.000 
0.143 
-2.49695** 
(1.0859) 
0.14159 
(0.1/48) 
-0.16149** 
(0.0829) 
0.00026*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.05870 
(0.1630) 
0.03119 
(0.2094) 
0.03387** 
(0.0163) 
-0.01363 
(0.1455) 
0.25913* 
(0.1553) 
0.21278 
(0.1821) 
0.21569 
(0.1817) 
0.09136 
(0.1020) 
0.20797** 
(0.0931) 
0.72158** 
(0.0740) 
-0.48061* 
(0.1531) 
4.98909*** 
(0.5125) 
1,367 
19.99 
0.000 
0.147 
-2.73689** 
(1.0264) 
0.08593 
(0.1736) 
-0.20133** 
(0.0799) 
0.00024*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.05931 
(0.1612) 
0.01638 
(0.2102) 
0.02762* 
(0.0159) 
-0.02756 
(0.1536) 
0.26990 
(0.1863) 
0.21799 
(0.2369) 
0.22534 
(0.2479) 
0.03178 
(0.1257) 
0.39989*** 
(0.1187) 
0.62411*** 
(0.0803) 
-0.22679* 
(0.1251) 
0.48730*** 
(0.1049) 
5.32567* 
(0.5939) 
1,367 
20.70 
0.000 
0.154 
"Statistically significant at 90 percent. 
""Statistically significant at 95 percent. 
"""Statistically significant at 99 percent. 
a. The dependent variable is local traffic. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
This content downloaded from 138.40.209.21 on Thu, 9 Jan 2014 07:17:04 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M?ximo Torero, Enrique Schroth, and Alberto Pasco-Font 121 
TABLE A 5. Est?mate of Usage Demand for Domestic Long-Distance in Rest of Peru3 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) 
Domestic long-distance rate 
Local rate 
International long-distance rate 
Income 
Income2 
Percentage of young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Number of persons in the household 
Educational level of household head: 
elementary school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: 
high school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: technical (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: university (dummy) 
Relatives in provinces 
Household in Cusco (dummy) 
Household in Chiclayo (dummy) 
Household in Arequipa (dummy) 
Inverse Mills ratio (reported bill) 
Inverse Mills ratio (has telephone) 
Household with cellular phone 
Constant 
Summary statistic 
No. observations 
F 
Prob > F 
R2 
-0.88501*** 
(0.2668) 
-4.12475*** 
(1.6130) 
-0.12508 
(0.1551) 
0.00034*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.17735 
(0.1863) 
-0.07650*** 
(0.0257) 
1.63948*** 
(0.5877) 
1.70888*** 
(0.5980) 
1.68089*** 
(0.6474) 
1.75020*** 
(0.6558) 
0.64753*** 
(0.2481) 
0.33691* 
(0.2006) 
0.17987 
(0.2815) 
-0.23580 
(0.1529) 
-0.10615 
(0.1974) 
2.71871*** 
(0.9795) 
1,348 
9.04 
0.000 
0.094 
-0.87675*** 
(0.2670) 
-4.12207*** 
(1.6117) 
-0.12430 
(0.1552) 
0.00038*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.18594 
(0.1873) 
-0.07736*** 
(0.0269) 
1.68961*** 
(0.5812) 
1.80220*** 
(0.5815) 
1.81349*** 
(0.6123) 
1.89511*** 
(0.6086) 
0.64570*** 
(0.2484) 
0.28073* 
(0.1646) 
0.04933 
(0.1269) 
-0.26647 
(0.1454) 
-0.05551 
(0.2638) 
2.51191* 
(0.8850) 
1,348 
8.89 
0.000 
0.094 
-0.93084*** 
(0.2660) 
-4.44237*** 
(1.4689) 
-0.17276 
(0.1619) 
0.00033** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.14466 
(0.1845) 
-0.07293*** 
(0.0255) 
1.60505** 
(0.5908) 
1.65058*** 
(0.6017) 
1.61857** 
(0.6498) 
1.68795** 
(0.6590) 
0.61198** 
(0.2459) 
0.38886* 
(0.1988) 
0.21719 
(0.2814) 
-0.22870 
(0.1514) 
-0.11262 
(0.1968) 
0.66546*** 
(0.1914) 
3.05057*** 
(0.9870) 
1,348 
9.31 
0.000 
0.103 
"Statistically significant at 90 percent. 
""Statistically significant at 95 percent. 
"""Statistically significant at 99 percent. 
a. The dependent variable is domestic long-distance traffic. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE A 6. Estimate of Usage Demand for International Long-Distance in Rest of Peru3 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) 
International long-distance rate 
Local rate 
Domestic long-distance rate 
Income 
Income2 
Percentage of young people in household 
(13-24 years) 
Number of persons in the household 
Educational level of household head: 
elementary school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: 
high school (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: technical (dummy) 
Educational level of household head: university (dummy) 
Relatives abroad 
Household in Cusco (dummy) 
Household in Chiclayo (dummy) 
Household in Arequipa (dummy) 
Inverse Mills ratio (reported bill) 
Inverse Mills ratio (has telephone) 
Household with cellular phone 
Constant 
Summary statistic 
No. observations 
F 
Prob > F 
R2 
-0.43053** 
(0.1965) 
-0.01529 
(0.3930) 
0.03703 
(0.1468) 
0.00005 
(0.0001) 
0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.19958** 
(0.0868) 
-0.01994* 
(0.0107) 
0.33842** 
(0.1548) 
0.29067 
(0.1863) 
0.19674 
(0.2192) 
0.21843 
(0.2256) 
0.22898*** 
(0.0323) 
0.01044 
(0.0885) 
0.08130 
(0.1423) 
0.05964 
(0.0782) 
-0.06003 
(0.1012) 
1.49021* 
(0.7621) 
1,356 
5.56 
0.000 
0.094 
-0.42671** 
(0.1954) 
-0.01583 
(0.3949) 
0.03966 
(0.1453) 
0.00001 
(0.0001) 
0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.16790** 
(0.0851) 
-0.01223 
(0.0114) 
0.26026* 
(0.1469) 
0.13647 
(0.1569) 
-0.00010 
(0.1618) 
0.01178 
(0.1643) 
0.22439*** 
(0.0320) 
0.05188 
(0.0632) 
0.04759 
(0.0575) 
0.12444 
(0.0752) 
-0.30395 
(0.1187) 
1.67851** 
(0.7375) 
1,356 
5.7 
0.000 
0.098 
-0.43494* 
(0.1941) 
-0.07140 
(0.4064) 
0.02646 
(0.1478) 
0.00005 
(0.0001) 
0.00000 
(0.0000) 
-0.19584* 
(0.0868) 
-0.01913 
(0.0107) 
0.32229* 
(0.1563) 
0.27034 
(0.1888) 
0.17311 
(0.2213) 
0.19743 
(0.2280) 
0.22152* 
(0.0325) 
0.01773 
(0.0896) 
0.08935 
(0.1432) 
0.06154 
(0.0785) 
-0.06180 
(0.1016) 
0.12587 
(0.1377) 
1.54550* 
(0.7535) 
1,356 
5.25 
0.000 
0.096 
"Statistically significant at 90 percent. 
""Statistically significant at 95 percent. 
"""Statistically significant at 99 percent. 
a. The dependent variable is international long-distance traffic. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Comments 
Miguel Urquiola: The main goal of this paper is to estimate the welfare 
effects of the Peruvian telecommunications privatization. The authors also 
use their findings to provide an explanation for why privatization is not 
popular in Peru (as in much of Latin America), despite the fact that it 
seems to have had a number of salutary effects. The paper improves on the 
previous literature insofar as the data it relies on offer advantages relative 
to those typically analyzed. The use of these data, unfortunately, is simul 
taneously a significant weakness, in that information collected during a 
single year is used to make inferences on a lengthy period that witnessed 
many changes in the sector, which introduces several potential biases. 
This comment closes with some thoughts on what we can learn from such 
results regarding the low approval rates accorded to privatization. 
This issue of how privatization affects the level and distribution of wel 
fare has been analyzed before for Latin America, notably in a series of 
papers summarized by McKenzie and Mookherjee in an earlier issue of 
this journal.1 Such work generally relies on household survey data, which 
have a key limitation because they typically describe only households' 
expenditure on broad aggregates like telecommunication services. From 
these, it is sometimes impossible to identify the specific quantities of ser 
vices consumed at specific prices. This is particularly problematic in the 
case of telecommunications, which involves a complex basket of available 
services (such as fixed-line local calls, national and international long 
distance calls, and cellular telephony). Estimations thus have to rely on a 
series of assumptions and approximations. 
In contrast, Torero, Schroth, and Pasco-Font use a survey specifically 
geared to telephone services, one that also entailed the transcription of 
billing information. The survey has a substantial sample size and follows 
a panel of households over a period with price variation, so that changes 
in quantities and prices are accurately observed. In this regard, this paper 
1. McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003). 
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offers a solid starting point for its estimations. Collecting such data is 
never easy, and the authors should be commended for doing it. 
Unfortunately, the use of this information also introduces a number of 
potential biases, which arise because the data were collected over a period 
of only ten months, mostly in 1997. One illustration of the type of prob 
lems this may cause is the correction for access to fixed-line phone ser 
vices in the demand estimations, which is a key aspect of the estimation 
implemented. The postprivatization expansion of fixed-line connections in 
Peru essentially took place between 1994 and 1996. This means that the 
characteristics of households that did not have access in 1997 (at the time 
the survey was taken) are probably quite different from those that did not 
enjoy it in 1993 or 1994, and this can affect the validity of the correction 
substantially. 
A related point concerns the introduction of cellular telephones. Given 
their relative lack of importance in 1997, the survey used did not collect 
information on cellular services. Cell phone coverage has expanded dra 
matically since then, however. This is very important because as the 
authors themselves explain, the main source of variation in welfare 
changes across socioeconomic groups originates in the relative impor 
tance of fixed costs. A driving force behind the increase in cellular cover 
age, however, is precisely the reduction in the fixed costs of access 
(certainly relative to fixed-line services), and it is likely that new sub 
scribers have experienced large welfare gains from this service. This sim 
ply cannot be elicited using the 1997 data. The very low penetration rate 
that existed then may explain, for instance, why the authors find cell 
phones are complements to rather than substitutes for fixed-line services. 
This might be the case for high-income households, but it would be sur 
prising among low-income customers that gained access more recently? 
and these are precisely the individuals that, in some sense, are the ultimate 
focus of this study. 
The bottom line is that information from one year is being used to make 
inferences on six rather different years. This is a key source of concern 
over and above any other methodological issues one may worry about 
(like the use of weighted price averages), which would also arise with 
other types of information. 
A more general point concerns whether we can attribute all these effects 
to privatization itself. Cellular expansion is a major part of the story of 
what happened to telephone services in Peru in the 1990s. Calling this a 
This content downloaded from 138.40.209.21 on Thu, 9 Jan 2014 07:17:04 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M?ximo Torero, Enrique Schroth, and Alberto Pasco-Font 125 
privatization effect implies that no such expansion would have occurred 
under the state-owned CPT-ENTEL, which seems a rather extreme 
assumption. A general obstacle in this type of analysis is the lack of clar 
ity on what the appropriate counterfactual should be. 
A final comment arises because the authors use their welfare findings to 
make inferences on why privatization is not popular in Peru, as elsewhere 
in Latin America. This discussion, while certainly interesting, seems to be 
too narrowly focused. To truly gauge the public's reaction to these 
reforms, at least two issues must be considered. First, other economic 
aspects, like the effect of privatization on workers, must be taken into 
account. As the debates over free trade illustrate, a few severely affected 
groups can do much to undermine support for policies that are welfare 
enhancing for the population at large. Second, understanding the public's 
perception of privatization is probably not possible relying solely on data 
on welfare effects. Rather, people's evaluation of specific reforms is prob 
ably related to broader factors like their assessment of the government(s) 
that implemented the reforms, their opinion of the government(s) that ini 
tiated the entire liberalization process, and their perception of their coun 
try's current economic condition. For instance, presidents can get credit or 
blame for booms or recessions that economists say they had little to do 
with. Similarly, in Latin America, neoliberal policies (many of which 
made privatization a flagship reform) are blamed for a regionwide reces 
sion that began in the late 1990s. 
In short, the leverage one can get out of pure economic welfare calcu 
lations in this area seems rather limited. Nonetheless, the calculations and 
discussion presented in this interesting paper certainly are a useful contri 
bution to evaluating the social consequences of privatization in Latin 
America. 
Rolf J. L?ders: The topic of the paper by Torero, Schroth, and Pasco 
Font?namely, the welfare impact of telecommunications privatizations 
in Peru on all consumers as well as by income groups?is clearly an 
important one. Most economists today would agree that the agency prob 
lem is more acute for firms in the public sector than in the private sector, 
and that governments should therefore leave the management of firms in 
the hands of the latter. Privatizations do not enjoy widespread popular sup 
port, however, either in Latin America in general or in Peru in particular. 
In the Peruvian case, Torero, Schroth, and Pasco-Font explain the appar 
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ent contradiction of significant aggregate net welfare benefits combined 
with low approval rates as the result of the differential welfare impact of 
telecommunications privatizations on the rich, which are relatively few 
and received most of the benefits, and the poor, which are many and ben 
efited little if at all. 
The authors' approach is interesting. The use of available survey infor 
mation to estimate the differential welfare impact of telecommunications 
privatizations on different income groups is, as far as I know, novel and 
leads to an interesting analysis. Specifically, Torero, Schroth, and Pasco 
Font use an available 1997 survey to estimate yearly consumer surplus 
changes?both total and by different income levels?following the Peru 
vian telecommunications privatizations. Demand functions are derived 
from a relatively standard consumer behavior model. The evolution of the 
estimates of the consumer surplus changes induced by telecommunica 
tions privatizations, by socioeconomic level, are then compared with the 
evolution of the approval rates of all privatizations in Peru. The conclu 
sion, without any formal proof, is that the latter evolution is closely related 
to the consumer surplus changes of the lower income groups. Finally, a 
policy proposal is made. 
The paper is not sufficiently explicit about the methodology used to 
obtain the consumer surplus estimates for different years based on a one 
year survey. In particular, there is not a sufficient discussion about the 
implicit assumptions and their implications for the results of the study. It 
is not clear how quantitative restrictions affect the consumer surplus esti 
mates, nor what the impact of changes in the quality of the telecommuni 
cations services might have been. 
A major problem of the paper is that it offers no evidence that the 
effects of the telecommunications privatizations determined the approval 
rates of all Peruvian privatizations. In fact, there is not even a very close 
relationship between consumer surplus estimate changes of the two lower 
income groups, which constitute the "losers" in the process of telecom 
munications privatizations, and said approval rate changes. The link to 
approval rates certainly makes the paper more interesting, but given that 
this link is not proven, insisting on it detracts from the value of the very 
interesting consumer surplus estimates. 
The policy proposal is in need of further analysis. Privatization was 
accompanied by a big shift in the tariff structure, in which the fixed charge 
was raised and the user rate lowered. Since lower income families use the 
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telephone relatively little and the rich much more, this tariff structure shift 
increased the price of each call for the poor (which according to the 
authors explains the low approval rate) and reduced the price for the rich. 
The authors propose, therefore, to partially reverse the tariff structure 
change, so as to increase the consumer surplus for the poor and lower it for 
the rich. If?and this is a big if?the present tariffs are optimal, this will 
reduce the total efficiency gains of the telecommunications privatizations. 
The authors do not even ask by how much. Furthermore, the paper does 
not explore whether there are any other, more efficient ways to compen 
sate the poor. If, for example, present tariffs are higher than optimum 
because the government wants to ensure a normal rate of return on assets 
that were bought at an excessively high price, then lowering present tariffs 
for everybody, compensated by a direct transfer from government to the 
telecommunications companies, might make a lot of sense. It would 
increase efficiency and also consumer surplus for all groups, including the 
poor. 
In summary, Torero, Schroth, and Pasco-Font present a paper on an 
interesting subject, in which they use a novel approach to estimating wel 
fare impacts of privatizations for different income groups. The paper 
would have gained significantly if the methodology had been made more 
explicit, perhaps in an appendix. The paper loses rigor when it tries to 
infer, without any proof, approval rates for all privatizations from con 
sumer welfare changes of telecommunications privatizations. The policy 
proposal made in the paper is, in all likelihood, oversimplified and alter 
natives are not discussed. 
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